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ARTICLES 
 
Tax Liability for Wage Theft 
 
Sachin S. Pandya
*
 
 
Abstract 
This paper shows how, under existing tax law, illegal wage underpayment by an 
employer (sometimes called “wage theft”) may generate employer tax liability for 
unreported income or disallowed business expense deductions. Given that the tax 
authority needs information from the underpaid worker to prove such liability, the paper 
identifies two ways that a worker can transmit that information to a tax authority: 
becoming a tax informant, or bringing a qui tam action under a state false claims act.  
Finally, the paper discusses possible influences on the decision of the unpaid worker to 
inform on the employer to the tax authority, and considers the conditions under which a 
tax authority is likely to audit an employer based on such information.  In so doing, the 
paper identifies a new approach to combating wage theft and an undiscovered 
implication of basic income tax law.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Employers often pay low-wage workers less than the wages that they must pay 
by law.  This wage underpayment (sometimes called “wage theft”) is widespread.1 It 
persists in low-wage sectors, despite the prospect of private civil actions under state 
contract law and the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), civil proceedings by the United 
States Department of Labor (“USDOL”) and by state departments of labor,2 and state 
prosecutions under criminal theft-of-service statutes.
3
  There are many plausible 
explanations for why such wage theft persists.  Some of them include the predominance 
of small firms; the growth of subcontracting; employer misclassifications of employees 
as independent contractors to avoid liability under FLSA and under other laws; and the 
particular prevalence and vulnerability of undocumented workers.
4
 
In turn, proposals to combat wage theft roughly fall into two groups.  One group 
of proposals focuses on how existing enforcement institutions, such as USDOL, can best 
use their limited resources to increase compliance.  These include tailoring enforcement 
strategy to the unique structure of particular industries; encouraging employers to hire 
third-party private monitors of labor violations
5
; and recruiting unions, workers’ centers, 
and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to gather information and, in some 
cases, monitor workplaces directly.
6
   
A second group of proposals focuses on amending existing law to overcome 
standard problems with private lawsuits by the unpaid workers.  One such problem is 
judgment-proof defendants.  Another is firms down the supply chain that pressure their 
contractors to reduce labor costs below mandated minimums but do not count as the 
unpaid worker’s “employer” under existing law.  Possible solutions include holding 
corporate shareholders jointly and severally liable for unpaid wages owed by the 
corporation,
7
 as well as imposing unpaid-wages liability on any and all firms down the 
supply chain that buy or sell the non-complaint employer’s goods and services, regardless 
                                                     
1 See, e.g., ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF 
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA'S CITIES (2008). 
2 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR: WAGE AND HOUR 
DIVISION'S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW WAGE WORKERS VULNERABLE TO 
WAGE THEFT (2009). 
3 Rita J. Verga, An Advocate's Toolkit: Using Criminal Theft of Service Laws to Enforce Workers' 
Right to Be Paid, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 283 (2005). 
4 See, e.g., Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcements through 
Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552, 554-55 (2010); David Weil, Enforcing 
Labour Standards in Fissured Workplaces: The US Experience, 22 ECON. & LABOUR REL. REV. 33, 36-43 
(2011).  
5 On different views of the success of this kind of approach to apparel contractors in the Los 
Angeles area by the U.S. Department of the Labor in the late 1990s, compare JILL ESBENSHADE, MONITORING 
SWEATSHOPS: WORKERS, CONSUMERS AND THE GLOBAL APPAREL INDUSTRY 60-118 (2004) with David Weil, 
Public Enforcement/Private Monitoring: Evaluating a New Approach to Regulating the Minimum Wage, 58 
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 238 (2005). 
6 Fine & Gordon, supra note 4, at 558-75. 
7 See N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 630(a) (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156, § 35 (2011).  Cf. Eric 
Tucker, Shareholder and Director Liability for Unpaid Workers’ Wages in Canada: From Conditions of 
Granting Limited Liability to Exceptional Remedy, 26 LAW & HIST. REV. 57 (2008) (history of such laws in 
Canada); Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Shareholder Liability for Claims by Employees, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 741 
(criticizing later-repealed Wisconsin statute). 
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of whether those other firms can be deemed to be the worker’s “employer” under the 
FLSA or other laws.
8
  
This paper identifies an unexpected source of existing law for addressing 
employer wage underpayment: tax law.  Part II argues that under existing federal and 
state tax law, under certain circumstances, employers may face income tax liability for 
wage underpayment if those employers fail to report the unpaid wages as gross income or 
take an unallowable business-expense deduction for those unpaid wages.   
The rest of the paper then discusses how such tax liability could be enforced.  
Part III suggests that because unpaid workers have the best evidence of wage 
underpayment, such tax liability cannot be effectively enforced unless those workers or 
their agents tell the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or state tax authorities what they 
know.  To do this, those workers can become tax informants.  In a few states, those 
workers can also pursue qui tam tax fraud actions under the state's false claims act.  In 
Part IV, the paper discusses the conditions under which the unpaid worker might pursue 
these avenues, and in turn considers when a tax authority is likely to audit an employer 
based on such an informant’s information.  Finally, Part V shows how the tax approach 
identified here complements other legal approaches to combating wage theft. 
 In so doing, this paper contributes to the research literature in two ways.  First, 
the tax and employment law literatures have rarely covered wage underpayment as a tax 
liability issue.
9
  To date, no one has identified a basis under existing tax law for treating 
wage underpayment as generating employer tax liability, let alone discussed how such 
liability might be enforced.  In doing so, this paper bridges the tax and employment law 
literatures by offering a new legal approach to combating wage theft.  This approach is 
best taken not as a substitute for, but an important complement to, existing legal 
approaches.  Second, the paper advances the theoretical literature on the law enforcement 
uses of bounties and rewards.  That literature has discussed tax informant rewards and qui 
tam actions
10
 but has not focused on the low-wage or undocumented worker as a tax 
informant. 
                                                     
8 E.g., Timothy B. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment Law? Accountability for Wage 
and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 227-28 
(2011) (proposing strict liability for wage and hour violations in the production of any goods and services 
that a firm buys, sells, or distributes, but “only for the portion of the violations attributable to the goods or 
services it purchases, sells, or distributes”); Hina B. Shah, Broadening Low-Wage Workers’ Access to 
Justice: Guaranteeing Unpaid Wages in Targeted Industries, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 9, 35-37, 43-44 
(2010) (advocating extension of wage-guarantee provision on garment manufacturers in California Labor 
Code section 2673.1 to other low-wage sectors and with a private enforcement mechanism); Brishen Rogers, 
Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 34-60 (2010) (arguing for 
liability for downstream buyers of goods and services that fail to exercise due care to prevent wage and hour 
violations by upstream suppliers). 
9 An exception is Crane, who briefly considered the tax treatment of wage underpayment in a 
theoretical tax system with a completely closed tax base.  Charlotte Crane, Liabilities and the Need to Keep 
the Income Tax Base Closed, 25 VA. TAX REV. 31, 54 (2005). 
10 Yosef Mealem et al., Whistle-blowers as Deterrents to Tax Evasion, 38 PUB. FIN. REV. 306 
(2010); Omri Yadlin, The Conspirator Dilemma: Introducing the "Trojan Horse" Enforcement Strategy, 2 
REV. LAW & ECON. 25 (2006); Ben Depoorter & Jeff De Mot, Whistle Blowing: An Economic Analysis of the 
False Claims Act, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 135 (2006); Robert Cooter & Nuno Garoupa, The Virtuous Circle 
of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes (University of California, Berkeley 
Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series, 2000); Gideon Yaniv, Revenge, Tax Informing, and 
the Optimal Bounty, 3 J. PUB. ECON. THEORY 225 (2001); Marsha J. Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching 
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II. TAX LIABILITY 
This Part presents a legal argument that, under existing federal and state tax law, 
an employer may incur income tax liability for failing to report gross income derived 
from not paying wages owed for services rendered, or for claiming paid or unpaid wages 
as deductible business expenses.  This Part also concludes that wage underpayment does 
not generate employer payroll tax liability or violations of income tax withholding 
requirements. 
A.  Unpaid Wages as Employer Income 
An employer that practices wage underpayment faces penalties under tax law that 
may arise because the employer has failed to report the unpaid wages as gross income.  
This conclusion derives from two settled readings of § 61(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which defines gross income to include, unless otherwise provided, “all income 
from whatever source derived.”  First, a taxpayer that benefits from a service has received 
income.  Second, gain derived from an activity is not excluded from gross income simply 
because that activity is illegal.  Moreover, it is also relatively settled that a taxpayer that 
benefits from a service has received income to the extent of the fair market value of that 
service, an approach that, as argued here, implies that the amount of income so received 
cannot be less than the amount of pay to which the worker was entitled under existing 
laws.  
The discussion that follows similarly implicates liability under state tax law.  
Most states that tax personal or corporate income have incorporated the federal definition 
of gross income and, accordingly, these readings thereof, into their own tax law by 
adopting the federal income tax base (variously, federal gross, adjusted gross, net, or 
taxable income) as at least the starting point for calculating state income tax.
11
 
1.  The Value of Misappropriated Labor is Employer Income 
When an employer underpays wages, the employer gains an item of income.  
This follows in two steps.  
First, when an employer underpays wages, the employer gains income by paying 
less than the cash value of the services performed by the worker.  Suppose the employer 
promised the worker $100 in exchange for performing certain services, and that $100 is 
the cash value of those services.  If the employer then only paid $45 upon completion of 
those services, then the employer has gained $55 in income.  The income arrives to the 
employer in the form of the gain from services equal to the cash value of those services 
($100), less the amount actually paid for them ($45).  This amount is income even though 
the gain arrives in the form of services, not cash or property.  Section 61(a) covers 
income “from whatever source.”  Moreover, Treasury Regulation § 1.61-1(a) provides 
that “[g]ross income includes income realized in any form, whether in money, property, 
or services.  Income may be realized, therefore, in the form of services . . . as well as in 
cash.”
12
  
Second, for wage underpayment to generate employer income, the employer 
must not recognize any employer obligation to pay the worker the wages owed but as yet 
unpaid.  If both worker and employer agree that the employer is so obliged, then the 
                                                                                                                                                 
for Dollars: The Economics and Public Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141 
(1999). 
11 All St. Tax Guide (RIA) ¶ 221 (2011). 
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1960). 
118 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.3:113 
 
unpaid wages are not income, but a debt.  Proceeds from loans do not count as gross 
income under federal and state tax law, because both debtor and creditor recognize that 
the debtor is legally obliged to repay the amount in question, and that liability is treated 
as offsetting the debtor’s gain from the loan proceeds.
13
  Thus, unpaid wages are income 
to the employer if and when that employer stops recognizing those unpaid wages as a 
debt to be paid to the worker for services rendered.
14
   
Accordingly, when the unpaid wages count as part of employer gross income 
depends on when the employer stops treating those unpaid wages as a debt.  This matters 
if the employer stops treating the unpaid wages as a debt in a taxable year after the 
taxable year in which the worker renders services.  To illustrate, consider by analogy an 
employer that attempts to pay wages to a worker and then, after a time, when those wages 
remain uncollected, decides to stop treating those wages as a debt.  For example, in 
Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co. v. Burnet (1931), a steam railroad company had “carried” 
$441.05 in uncollected employee wages “on its books to be paid when called for, or when 
those entitled were located,” and the company had taken a deduction for those wages in 
1921.
15
  In December 1924, the company made an entry in its books “crediting 'Profit and 
Loss' with $441.05 on account of” those still unpaid wages.  The court reasoned: 
“Though the company intended paying proper claims on the fund if and when sought,” 
since the “effect” of this bookkeeping change made available the $441.05 “for general 
uses,” it became “a part of the [company's] gross revenue in 1924 as though paid in that 
year,” and thus “a part of the net on which the tax levied became due.”
16
  Although the 
railroad company never actually paid the $441.05 before or during 1924, that amount 
became part of its gross income only in 1924, because, as evinced by the bookkeeping 
change, only in that year did it stop treating those wages as a liability on its books (a 
debt).
17
  To be sure, the company may have done so because it doubted that the workers 
                                                     
13 Joseph M. Dodge, Exploring the Income Tax Treatment of Borrowing and Liabilities, or Why the 
Accrual Method Should Be Eliminated, 26 VA. TAX REV. 245, 253-55 (2006); Boris I. Bittker & Barton H. 
Thompson Jr, Income from the Discharge of Indebtedness: The Progeny of United States v. Kirby Lumber 
Co., 66 CAL. L. REV. 1159 (1978). 
14 I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (2006).  The argument is not that employer wage underpayment generates 
employer “[i]ncome from discharge of indebtedness.”  For that to happen, the unpaid worker (the creditor) 
has to have taken the additional and unlikely step of forgiving or canceling the employer's debt (the liability 
for the unpaid wages).  Even then, gain from discharge-of-indebtedness is excluded from gross income “to 
the extent that payment of the liability would have given rise to a deduction.” I.R.C. § 108(e)(2) (2006).  
Wage payments are deductible as business expenses under I.R.C. § 162.  See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2006) 
(allowing as a deduction “a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services 
actually rendered”).  Therefore, any cancellation of an employer’s wage debt by the worker would still not 
result in discharge-of-indebtedness income. 
15 Charleston W. C. Ry. Co. v. Burnet, 50 F.2d 342, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1931). 
16 Id.  Then, as now, federal tax law defined a corporation's gross income, absent certain 
exceptions, to follow the definition of an individual's gross income. I.R.C. § 985(a) (1925-26).  That 
definition included “gains, profits, and income derived from . . . the transaction of business carried on for 
gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever.”  Id. § 954(a). 
17 For other uncollected-wage examples, see Chicago R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Comm’r, 47 F.2d 990, 
992 (7th Cir. 1931) (Commissioner properly charged to gross income company checks and vouchers for 
compensation for services and in payment of loss or damage claims that company charged to profit and loss if 
not presented for payment within two years from date issued); Beacon Auto Stores, Inc. v. Comm’r, 42 
B.T.A. 703, 704-05 (1940) (corporation realized income when it extinguished undrawn salary credits to 
shareholders by debit to their individual accounts and a corresponding credit to surplus account).  
Uncollected-wage tax cases like Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co. may well be far less likely today given the 
widespread adoption of state escheat statutes, most of which impose a one-year period before uncollected 
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would ever collect the unpaid wages, even while still intending to pay those wages if 
those workers sought to collect.  In contrast, in a wage theft scenario, the employer 
abandons any intent to pay even if the worker later seeks to collect.  In either case, 
however, what matters is that the employer stopped treating the unpaid wages as a debt, 
not the precise reason why it did so. 
2.  Gross Income Includes Gains Derived From Illegal Activity 
When an employer underpays wages, the employer gains income for tax law 
purposes even though such underpayment is illegal under other law.  Since United States 
v. Sullivan (1927), the United States Supreme Court has read the federal tax code's 
definition of income to include gains derived from illegal activity.
18
  In Sullivan, the 
taxpayer had been convicted for failing to file a tax return as required by the Revenue Act 
of 1921.  The case turned on whether the Revenue Act of 1921 required the taxpayer to 
report his income derived from selling intoxicating liquor, an activity that violated the 
National Prohibition Act.  In upholding the conviction, the Court emphasized that while 
the Revenue Act of 1913 had defined a taxable person’s net income to include “the 
transaction of any lawful business carried on for gain or profit,” the word “lawful” did 
not appear in the successor provision in the Revenue Act of 1921.
19
  In later definitions 
of income under federal tax law, Congress continued this omission. 
Years later, in James v. United States (1961), the Court confirmed that 
embezzled funds count as income by ruling that a union official who had embezzled from 
his employer union was obliged to report those illegal appropriations as gross income in 
the year in which they were received.  The Court declared: “When a taxpayer acquires 
earnings, lawfully or unlawfully, without the consensual recognition, express or implied, 
of an obligation to repay and without restriction as to their disposition,” those earnings 
count as gross income under I.R.C. § 61(a), even though the taxpayer may be later found 
not to be entitled to it.
20
  
In this respect, James simply confirmed that gains from illegal activity fall within 
the general rule that tax treatment of a gain as proceeds from a debt or as income turns on 
whether both sides of the transaction recognize any obligation to repay in the taxable 
year.  In James and other embezzlement cases, the illegally obtained money or property 
has counted as income in the year of receipt, presumably because the embezzler intended 
to use the acquired money or property for personal use (the embezzlement) at the same 
time, or in the same year, that he acquired it.  Subsequent examples of illegal gross 
income in lower court opinions include racing tickets stolen by the employee of a betting 
                                                                                                                                                 
wages are deemed abandoned to the state.  See 1 DAVID J. EPSTEIN, UNCLAIMED PROPERTY LAW AND 
REPORTING FORMS § 5.21 (2012). 
18 See Boris I. Bittker, Taxing Income From Unlawful Activities, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 130 
(1974); Frank M. Keesling, Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5 UCLA L. REV. 26, 26-33 (1958). 
19 United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927).  Congress had removed “lawful” from the 
definition of income in 1916.  Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, § 2(a), 39 Stat. 756, 757.  Henry 
Campbell Black declared it “probable” that Congress had intended the word “lawful” in the Revenue Act of 
1913 to “exclude occupations forbidden to all persons, as being immoral or contrary to public policy” out of 
concern that “taxing them might appear to legalize them.”  HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE 
LAW OF INCOME TAXATION UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS 99 (1913). 
20 James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213, 219 (1961) (Warren, C.J., plurality opinion). 
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parlor
21
 and sums received for vessel repair services that were invoiced but not actually 
performed.
22
 
3. Illegality and Fair Market Value 
Whereas the illegality of wage underpayment does not preclude counting the 
benefit of services received as gross income to the employer, such illegality can affect 
how much income an employer gains from wage underpayment, because of the “fair 
market value” approach to valuation of services.  
Since the early twentieth century, federal tax law has determined the cash value 
of property using the concept of “fair market value,” defined for certain federal income 
tax purposes as “the price at which the property would change hands between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both 
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”
23
 
The IRS has often used a “fair market value” concept for determining the cash 
value of services without any apparent difference in meaning when applied to services 
instead of property.
24
  For example, since at least 1938, a Treasury regulation has 
provided that when a person pays for services rendered with property rather than cash, 
the resulting income to the payee is “the fair market value of the property taken in 
payment.”
25
  The same regulation also provides: “If the services are rendered at a 
stipulated price, such price will be presumed to be the fair market value of the 
compensation received in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”
26
  To illustrate this 
presumption, suppose a taxpayer initially agrees to provide services for $100 (the 
“stipulated price”) but thereafter accepts a wood table in lieu of that $100 as payment.  
                                                     
21 Collins v. Comm’r, 3 F.3d 625, 627 (2d Cir. 1993). 
22 McGee v. Comm’r, 519 F.2d 1121, 1123 (5th Cir. 1975). 
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1972) (charitable contribution of property); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2008) (same); Treas. Reg. § 1.412(c)(2)-1 (1980) (deferred 
compensation plan assets); Treas. Reg. § 1.415(c)-1(b)(5) (2007) (contribution of property to defined 
contribution plan); Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(i)-4 (1973) (clothing provided to members of certain religious 
orders); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-4(a)(3), 1.737-1(b)(2) (1995) (similar for property distributed to 
partnership).  A similar definition of “fair market value” of property appears in the federal estate tax, Treas. 
Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 1965), and the federal gift tax, Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (1992).  This 
definition of “fair market value” precedes its appearance in federal tax law.  For early critical commentary on 
this definition as it appeared in other laws, see JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPERTY: A 
TREATISE ON THE APPRAISAL OF PROPERTY FOR DIFFERENT LEGAL PURPOSES 59-61 (1937).  On applications 
and extensions of this definition of “fair market value” for property valuation under federal tax law, see JOHN 
A. BOGDANSKI, FEDERAL TAX VALUATION ¶ 2.01 (1996 & Supp. 2011). 
24 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.74-1(a)(2) (1960) (services provided as a prize); Treas. Reg. § 1.952-
1(a)(4) (as amended in 2002) (illegal payment in the form of services by or on behalf of a controlled foreign 
corporation to government officials); Treas. Reg. § 1.82-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1978) (employer moving of 
employee's “household goods and personal effects from the employee's old resident to his new residence 
using the employer's facilities”); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(1)(i)-(ii),(2)(i)(B) (as amended in 2008) (services 
for which taxpayer makes payment claimed as charitable contribution); Treas. Reg. § 1.199-3(i)(4) (2008) 
(allocation for domestic production gross receipts attributable to performance of embedded services); Treas. 
Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(8) (2004) (services to produce or improve real property); Treas. Reg. § 1.276-1(f)(3) (as 
amended in 1969) (whether proceeds received by political candidate for services rendered are received in 
ordinary course of candidate's trade or business); Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-3(e)(1) (as amended in 2012) (“The 
amount of a payment made in a medium other than U.S. dollars is measured by the fair market value of the 
property or services provided in lieu of U.S. dollars.”). 
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (as amended in 2003). 
26 Id.  For discussion, see, for example, BOGDANSKI, supra note 23, ¶ 3.07[4]; Robert I. Keller, The 
Taxation of Barter Transactions, 67 MINN. L. REV. 441, 456-57 (1982). 
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Under this regulation, the fair market value of that wood table, and thus the resulting 
income to the taxpayer, is presumptively $100. 
In 1957, this regulation was amended to include services as well as property.
27
  
Today, that regulation provides that when a person pays for services with other services, 
the resulting income to the payee is “the fair market value of such other services.”
28
  For 
example, if a housepainter paints a lawyer's house in exchange for the lawyer's personal 
legal services, the housepainter's gross income must include the “fair market value” of 
those legal services.
29
  The “stipulated price” presumption remains: If the non-cash 
compensated services “are rendered at a stipulated price, such price will be presumed to 
be the fair market value of the compensation received in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary.”
30
  
In this and other uses of “fair market value” to determine the cash value of 
services, the term “fair market value” is not expressly defined.  In contrast, in setting “fair 
market value” as the computational starting point for valuing fringe benefits, the IRS has 
defined “fair market value” to mean what “an individual would have to pay for the 
particular fringe benefit in an arm's-length transaction,” without regard to “any special 
relationship” between employer and employee, or how the employee subjectively 
perceives the benefit's value, and not wholly determined by the benefit's cost to the 
employer.
31
  This definition resembles the willing-buyer/willing-seller definition of the 
“fair market value” of property.  Both refer to a hypothetical transaction in which the 
buyer and seller have no prior relationship (“arm's-length transaction”).  Fringe benefits 
can be services, such as, for example, chauffeur services.
32
  This too implies no sharp 
difference in the meaning of “fair market value” when used to determine the cash value 
of services rather than property. 
Given federal tax law's widespread use of “fair market value” to value services, 
judges and tax officials may be inclined to use “fair market value” to calculate the cash 
value of an unpaid worker's services.
33
  Importantly, “fair market value” does not 
necessarily require taking the contract price as the full measure of the service's cash 
value, though judges could well treat it as presumptively so.  In this respect, “fair market 
value” operates no differently, better or worse, for valuing services than for valuing 
property in screening out those aspects of the actual transaction that may have led to a 
                                                     
27 22 Fed. Reg. 9420 (Nov. 26, 1957) (¶1(B)).  The 1938 antecedent to the current Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.61-2(d)(1) referred only to payment for services with “something other than money” and the “fair market 
value” of the “thing” taken in payment,” and presumed that, absent contrary evidence, any “stipulated price” 
for services rendered was the “fair value” of the compensation received.  Treas. Reg. § 3.22(a)-3 (1938). 
28 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1). 
29 Rev. Rul. 79-24, 1979-1 C.B. 60.  See also Badell v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 422, 425 (2000) 
(roofing services as income). 
30 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1). 
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(b)(1)-(2) (as amended in 1992). 
32 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(b)(5) (specifying how to compute fair market value of chauffeur services 
provided as fringe benefit). 
33 See, e.g., Koons v. United States, 315 F.2d 542, 545 (9th Cir. 1963) (upholding IRS use of “fair 
market value” to determine cash value of employer provision of moving company services to transport 
employee's household furniture); Rooney v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 523, 528-29 (1987) (finding for federal income 
tax purposes the “fair market value” of goods and services received by accounting firm to cover unpaid bills 
to be the prices charged by the firm's clients to their retail customers, and citing the willing-buyer/willing-
seller definition of “fair market value” under federal estate tax, Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b) (as amended in 
1965)). 
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higher or lower contract price.  For example, we might suppose that the contract price for 
services exceeds “fair market value” where a restaurant owner's sister pressures the 
owner to hire his nephew as wait staff for wages higher than what that owner could have 
paid a stranger to do the same work.  
More importantly, the “fair market value” concept also requires accounting for 
federal and state laws that affect the contract price for labor.  Federal and state wage and 
hour statutes impose a price floor in labor markets, much as government price floors exist 
for certain commodities, such as cow's milk.
34
  Federal employment discrimination 
statutes prohibit wage discrimination with respect to certain worker characteristics.  
These laws matter, because “fair market value” seems to require imagining, as part of the 
hypothetical arm's-length transaction, that the hypothetical buyer and seller complete the 
transaction without violating the legislated price floor or wage-discrimination 
prohibitions.  
For example, a sale price below a price floor set by a minimum wage statute 
seems to suggest that the seller was “under [a] compulsion” to sell at that price, because 
the “fair market value” concept requires imagining hypothetical sellers that aim to 
maximize sale price
35
 and that have “reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts,” here 
the minimum sale price set by applicable wage and hour statutes.  If so, the price floor set 
by minimum wage law determines the minimum cash value of services generated by the 
“fair market value” inquiry, precisely because at the time of the actual transaction, that 
price floor applied generally to all buyers and sellers of those services.  To illustrate, 
suppose again that an employer promises $100 in exchange for certain services, but pays 
only $45.  Before, we had assumed that $100 was the cash value of those services, and 
from there concluded that the employer had gained $55 in gross income.  If, however, the 
applicable minimum wage statute had required the employer to pay at least $120 at that 
time, then no matter what the employer actually promised to pay, the employer has 
gained at least $75 in gross income. 
Similarly, where the restaurant owner hires a woman as a waiter for wages lower 
than what that owner would have had to pay a man to do the same work, the contract 
price for those services falls below “fair market value,” if that concept requires us to 
screen out any illegal labor market disadvantage that hypothetical female sellers of labor 
have because they are women.  Thus, if the Equal Pay Act
36
 forbids paying the female 
waiter less than current male waiter employees to do the same work, then a contract price 
that falls below the male waiters' wages may fall below “fair market value,” because “fair 
market value” assumes, again, that sellers aim to maximize sale price and have 
“reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts,” here how much the male waiters receive in 
wages and that any contract price below that amount violates the Equal Pay Act. 
This analysis is consistent with how “fair market value” is usually applied to 
property so as to account for statutes or regulations that restrict the use or sale of that 
                                                     
34 For brief discussion, see Milk Indus. Found. v. Glickman, 949 F. Supp. 882, 885-88 (D.D.C. 
1996). 
35 For “fair market value” of property, the Tax Court has sometimes expressed this intuition. See 
Dillard v. Comm’r, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 137, 143 (1961)  (“Fair market value contemplates two parties, both 
driving the hardest bargain he can to obtain the best possible price for himself.”); see also Jonathan T. 
Bromwell & Assoc. v. Comm’r, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 799, 808 (1993) (“To determine that an arm's-length 
transaction took place, we must find that the buyer was motivated to secure the lowest purchase price 
possible and, conversely, that the seller looked to obtain the highest price.”). 
36 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006). 
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property, such as zoning and environmental laws, or regulations on the sale of 
securities.
37
  The main difference may be that, putting aside wage ceilings, accounting for 
restrictions on the contract price for services—usually imposed on the buyer of services 
(the employer)—tends to increase the price of the services provided in the hypothetical 
arm's-length transaction.  In contrast, accounting for restrictions on the sale of property—
usually imposed on the seller of property—may tend to reduce the price of the property 
in the hypothetical arm's-length transaction, effectively forcing one to calculate a 
discount for the restriction’s effect on the marketability of the property.   
To be sure, the IRS also uses “fair market value” to value illegal goods, such as 
relying on the “retail street price” of illicit drugs, 38  which requires imagining the 
hypothetical buyer and seller violating the law by completing the transaction.  The 
reason, however, is that although the very transaction is illegal at any price, without 
imagining it nonetheless, there would be no market at all from which to estimate cash 
value.  The same reasoning would apply to using “fair market value” to determine the 
cash value of categorically illegal services, such as prostitution or private assassination.  
In contrast, price regulation of services, such as minimum wage statutes or the Equal Pay 
Act, imply a legal market for those services, because no legislature regulates prices for 
services that it has already banned at any price. 
B. Wage Underpayment and Business Expense Deductions 
The employer that practices wage underpayment may also face tax consequences 
for deducting unpaid wages, as well as certain kinds of wage payments, as business 
expenses.  Under § 162(a) of the Code, a taxpayer may deduct “all the ordinary and 
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or 
business, including . . . a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for 
personal services actually rendered.”39  Unless otherwise indicated, the timing of this 
deduction depends on the taxpayer's method of accounting.
40
 
The wage-underpaying employer faces two tax consequences with respect to how 
it claims business expense deductions for its wage payments.  First, whereas a cash-
method employer can never deduct unpaid wages as business expenses, an accrual-
method employer may do so under certain circumstances subject to operation of the tax 
benefit rule.  Second, regardless of its accounting method, an employer cannot deduct 
paid wages as business expenses if such wage payments violate provisions of minimum 
wage statutes that impose criminal penalties. 
1.  Unpaid Wages as Business Expense Deductions 
A business deduction for unpaid wages may be allowed, but this depends initially 
on the taxpayer’s chosen method of tax accounting.  Under the cash and disbursements 
method of accounting, wages are deductible as business expenses when paid.  Therefore, 
since unpaid wages are not “paid” compensation expenses for already rendered services, 
a cash method employer cannot deduct unpaid wages as business expenses. 
                                                     
37 See generally BOGDANSKI, supra note 23, ¶ 6.02. 
38 See, e.g., Jones v. Comm’r, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 1721, 1736 (1991) (“retail street value” of 
cocaine); Caffery v. Comm’r, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 807, 816 (1990) (using “market value” and “street value” 
interchangeably to refer to cash value of marijuana). 
39 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2006).  
40 I.R.C. § 461(a) (2006).  For examples of different timing rules for deducting compensation to 
another for services rendered, see I.R.C. § 83(h) (2006) and I.R.C. § 404(a)(5) (2006). 
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For the accrual method employer, however, business expense deductions are, in 
theory, allowable for unpaid wages under certain circumstances.  An accrual method 
taxpayer can usually deduct business expenses that have been “incurred . . . in the taxable 
year in which all the events have occurred that establish the fact of the liability, the 
amount of the liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy, and economic 
performance has occurred with respect to the liability.”
 41
  If the taxpayer's liability arises 
because “another person” provides services to the taxpayer, as a worker provides services 
to an employer, then “economic performance occurs as such person provides such 
services.”
42
 
Applying this test, suppose that in taxable year1, the accrual-method employer 
promises to pay the worker $100, and the worker renders the services, but the employer 
only pays the worker $45.  Once all these events occur, that employer's liability to pay 
the worker the unpaid wages is established under state contract law.  Alternatively, if 
under the applicable minimum wage the employer must pay $120, but in fact the 
employer only pays $45, the employer's liability to pay the worker $75 is established 
under the minimum wage statute.  In either case, the amount of the liability can be 
determined with reasonable accuracy, and economic performance has already occurred, 
because the worker has finished providing the promised services. 
Two outcomes are possible.  If, in our first example, that employer resolves to 
never pay the wages owed ($55) in that same year (year1), then that $55 cannot be an 
incurred compensation expense.  Indeed, as discussed earlier, at that point, the employer 
gains an item of income if the services' cash value exceeds wages actually paid.  This 
outcome is effectively the same as for the cash-method employer: In no year can this 
employer legally deduct the unpaid wages as business expenses. 
Suppose, however, that the employer claims the $100 (including the unpaid $55) 
as a business expense deduction in year1, but resolves not to pay the $55 in year2.  If so, 
then the deduction for that $55 is allowable in year1, because in that year, the employer is 
still treating the unpaid wages as a debt to be paid.  Once the employer stops treating the 
unpaid wages as a debt (in year2), the tax benefit rule applies.  That rule provides that a 
taxpayer that took a deduction in a prior year must include that amount as income in a 
later year when an event in that later year is "fundamentally inconsistent with the premise 
on which the deduction was initially based.”
43
  
Accordingly, in our example, the tax benefit rule triggers in year2, because in that 
year, the employer decided not to treat the unpaid $55 as a debt owed to the worker.  That 
decision is the event that is “fundamentally inconsistent” with the premise behind the 
deductibility of those unpaid wages in year1, that is, that the employer recognizes the $55 
in unpaid wages as a debt owed to the worker.
44
  However, if the employer would have 
                                                     
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1998); see I.R.C. § 461(h)(4) (2006) (“For purposes 
of this subsection, the all events test is met with respect to any item if all events have occurred which 
determine the fact of liability and the amount of such liability can be determined with reasonable accuracy.”). 
42 I.R.C. § 461(h)(2)(A)(i) (2206); accord Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(d)(2)(i) (as amended in 1998). 
43 Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 U.S. 370, 383 (1983).  The amount to be included as 
income in that later year, however, does not include the amount deducted if and “to the extent such amount 
did not reduce the amount of tax imposed” in the earlier year.  I.R.C. § 111(a) (2006). 
44 Such an employer, however, cannot benefit from I.R.C. § 1341, which applies if and only if “an 
item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or years) because it appeared that the taxpayer 
had an unrestricted right to such item.”  I.R.C. § 1341(a)(1) (2006).  Courts and the IRS have refused to read 
this text to include cases in which the taxpayer obtained an item of income in a prior taxable year in a 
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had the same tax liability regardless of whether it had deducted that $55 in year1, then the 
amount deducted in year1 is not treated as an item of income in year2. 
2.  Wage Payments that Violate Criminal Provisions of Minimum 
Wage Statutes Are Not Deductible 
Regardless of accounting method, business expense deductions for already paid 
wages may be disallowed if such wage payments violate the Fair Labor Standards Act or 
(some) state minimum wage statutes.  Section 162(c)(2) of the Code disallows business 
expense deductions “for any payment . . . made, directly or indirectly, to any person, if 
the payment constitutes an . . . illegal payment” under any federal law or “generally 
enforced” state law that, in pertinent part, “subjects the payor to a criminal penalty.”
45
  
For example, when a corporation paid wages in violation of a wage ceiling, set by 
presidential executive order, that subjected to a criminal fine any person paying wages or 
salaries “higher than those permitted hereunder,” then wages and salaries paid in excess 
of that wage ceiling counted as “illegal payments” under § 162(c)(2).
46
  
For § 162(c)(2) to apply, however, the payment at issue must be in and of itself 
illegal, not just connected to or made to further illegal activity.
47
  To illustrate, although 
some have suggested otherwise,
48
 wages paid to undocumented workers are not clearly 
“illegal payments” under § 162(c)(2) just because federal immigration law imposes 
criminal penalties on employers that engage in a “pattern or practice” of violating certain 
statutory subsections concerning the employment of undocumented workers.
49
  Those 
subsections make it unlawful for any person to knowingly “hire, or to recruit or refer for 
a fee, for employment” an “unauthorized alien,” or continue to employ the alien though 
knowing he or she is or has become an “unauthorized alien.”
50
  
Although wage payments are certainly connected with these activities,
51
 these 
subsections do not clearly make the wage payments to undocumented workers illegal in 
and of themselves.  For example, hiring an unauthorized alien under this statute occurs 
when the service or labor “commence[s],” because the word “hire” in the immigration 
statute means “the actual commencement of employment of an employee for wages or 
other remuneration,”
52
 and the word “employment” means “any service or labor 
performed by an employee for an employer within the United States.”
53
  Thus, the wage 
                                                                                                                                                 
knowingly illegal way.  See Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 299 (6th Cir. 1993); McKinney v. United 
States, 574 F2d. 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1978); Perez v. United States, 553 F. Supp. 558, 561 (M.D. Fla. 1982); 
IRS Chief Counsel Advice 200808019 (Feb. 22, 2008) available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0808019.pdf. 
45 I.R.C. § 162(c)(2) (2006). 
46 Rev. Rul. 72-236, 1972-1 C.B. 41. 
47 Bilzerian v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 134, 138-40 (1998); Manning v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1864, 1869 (2009); I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory 200128004, 2001 WL 789909 (July 13, 2001). 
48 Katherine D. Black et al., Is the IRS the Solution to Illegal Immigration?, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 309, 330 (2008). 
49 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(f)(1) (2006). 
50 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A), (a)(2). 
51 See, e.g., Incalza v. Fendi N. Am., Inc., 479 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that 
placing employee on unpaid leave after discovering his status as unauthorized alien complies with 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(a)(2) by “in effect, suspend[ing]” the alien's employment status “during the period that he is neither 
working nor receiving pay”). 
52 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(c) (2011). See Jenkins v. INS, 108 F.3d 195, 198 (9th Cir. 1997) (“If Santos 
had already begun physical labor, there can be little doubt that his employment had 'commenced' under 8 
C.F.R. § 274a.1(c).”). 
53 8 C.F.R. § 274a.1(h). 
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payments to undocumented workers are not illegal in and of themselves under that 
immigration statute, because the unauthorized alien can “commence[]” any particular 
service or labor before or after the employer pays wages to him or her for that service or 
labor. 
In contrast, § 162(c)(2) does apply to wage payments made in violation of some 
minimum wage statutes.  The Fair Labor Standards Act requires that “[e]very employer 
shall pay to each of his employees . . . wages” at certain specified rates.
54
  It further 
declares it “unlawful” for any person to violate that requirement and subjects any person 
who “willfully violates” that requirement to criminal penalties.
55
  Over half the states 
with minimum wage statutes similarly subject employers to criminal penalties for 
willfully paying below their state minimum wage rates.
56
  
Accordingly, if an employer pays a worker and, in so doing, violates these 
statutory provisions, then the payment in question is itself an “illegal payment” under 
§ 162(c)(2) for which, as a result, no business expense deduction is allowed.  To 
illustrate, suppose an employer willfully pays a worker $45 in exchange for performing 
certain services, but that, under the FLSA, the employer is required to pay the worker at 
least $120 for those services.  If so, the employer violates the FLSA by paying the $45 to 
the worker, and is subject to a criminal penalty for that violation.  Accordingly, if the 
employer then takes the $45 as a business-expense deduction under Code § 162(a), that 
deduction should be disallowed, because that $45 is, in and of itself, an “illegal payment” 
under § 162(c)(2). 
C.  No Payroll Tax or Withholding Liability 
This section concludes that it is unlikely that a court would find tax liability for 
wage underpayment under federal tax law governing payroll taxes and income 
withholding requirements. 
1.  Payroll Taxes 
Since their inception, federal programs for old age and disability insurance 
(Social Security), Medicare, and state unemployment insurance have imposed payroll 
taxes on employers and employees.
57
  The Federal Insurance Contributions Act (“FICA”) 
finances Social Security and Medicare by imposing on every individual a tax equal to a 
certain percentage of “the wages . . . received by him with respect to employment,”
58
 as 
well as imposing “on every employer an excise tax, with respect to having individuals in 
his employ” equal to a certain percentage of “the wages . . . paid by him with respect to 
employment.”
59
  
                                                     
54 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2006). See also 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(2)-(4) (same for certain categories of 
workers). 
55 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(a) (2006) (imposing a maximum fine of $10,000, or imprisonment for up to 
six months, or both, for willfully violating 29 U.S.C. § 215); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(2) (2006) (declaring it 
unlawful to violate 29 U.S.C. § 206). 
56 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149 § 27C (2011); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1199 (2012); MD. CODE 
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-508 (West 2011).  See generally WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A STATE-BY-STATE 
SURVEY (Gregory K. McGillivary ed., 2004 & Supp. 2010). 
57 On the decision to finance these programs with payroll taxes, see Mark H. Leff, Taxing the 
"Forgotten Man": The Politics of Social Security Finance in the New Deal, 70 J. AM. HIST. 359 (1983). 
58 I.R.C. § 3101(a)-(b) (2006). 
59 I.R.C. § 3111(a)-(b) (2006). 
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The Federal Unemployment Tax Act (“FUTA”), which governs unemployment 
insurance, contains similarly worded provisions: It imposes on employers “an excise tax, 
with respect to having individuals in his employ, equal to” a certain percentage “of the 
total wages . . . paid by him . . . with respect to employment.”
60
  
FICA also imposes a withholding requirement on employers: Employers must 
collect FICA taxes on employee wage income “by deducting the amount of the tax from 
the wages as and when paid.”
61
  The employer has tax liability for these required 
deductions,
62
 as do third parties that pay wages to the employer's employees,
63
 even if the 
employee does not collect the wages “paid by” the employer.
64
  
It is hard to read FICA and FUTA to impose tax obligations on owed but unpaid 
wages.  FICA's statutory text refers to taxes on wages “received” by the employee and 
“paid” by the employer.  FUTA's statutory text refers to wages “paid” by the employer.  
“Received” and “paid” are verbs used in the past tense.  Unpaid wages are, by definition, 
wages that are not “received” and not “paid,” or at least not yet.  Although FICA and 
FUTA cover both actual and “constructive” wage payments, “constructive” wage 
payments occur only when the employer credits the wages to an employee's account, or 
sets them apart for the employee, so that “they may be drawn upon by him at any time 
although not then actually reduced to possession.”
65
 
Similarly, FICA's employer withholding requirement also hinges on the 
employer’s duty to deduct employee FICA tax from wages “as and when paid.”  Treasury 
regulations on FICA are more explicit: “The employer tax attaches at the time that the 
wages are paid by the employer,”
66
 and the “employee tax attaches at the time that the 
wages are received by the employee.”
67
  The phrase “at the time” in these regulations 
implies that the FICA employer and employee tax do not attach until the wages are paid 
and received, respectively.  
2.  Income Tax Withholding 
Federal income tax withholding requirements do not authorize tax liability for 
failure to withhold taxes on wages owed but unpaid.  Since the Current Tax Payment Act 
of 1943,
68
 if an employer “mak[es] payment of wages,” it must “deduct and withhold 
upon such wages a tax” determined by the Treasury Secretary.
69
  Although the statutory 
phrase “upon such wages” could be read to cover both wages paid and wages owed, a 
Treasury regulation conforms the employer’s income-tax withholding obligation to the 
relevant text of the FICA withholding section: “The employer is required to collect the 
tax by deducting and withholding the amount thereof from the employee's wages as and 
                                                     
60 I.R.C. § 3301 (Supp. III 2009). 
61 I.R.C. § 3102(a) (2006). 
62 I.R.C. § 3102(b) (2006). 
63 I.R.C. § 3505(a) (2006). 
64 Treas. Reg. § 31.3102-1(d) (as amended in 2006). 
65 Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-2(b) (as amended in 2006) (FICA); Treas. Reg. § 31.3301-4 (1960) 
(same for FUTA). 
66 Treas. Reg. § 31.3111-3 (1960). 
67 Treas. Reg. § 31.3101-3 (1960). 
68 For historical background, see Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax To Mass Tax: The Role of 
Propaganda In The Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685 (1988). 
69 I.R.C. § 3402(a)(1) (2006). 
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when paid, either actually or constructively.”
70
  As with FICA and FUTA, employers 
make “constructive” wage payments for income-tax withholding purposes by crediting 
wages “to the account of or set apart for an employee so that they may be drawn upon by 
him at any time although not then actually reduced to possession.”
71
 
The same conclusion applies to the backup-withholding requirement for non-
wage payments for services, such as payments to independent contractors.  Under this 
provision, if a “reportable payment” occurs, the payor may be required to deduct and 
withhold thirty-one percent of that payment if the payee failed to properly furnish the 
payor with an accurate tax identification number and the IRS informs the payor that the 
tax identification number is incorrect.
72
  The phrase “reportable payment” includes “any 
payment of a kind, and to a payee, required to be shown on a return required under” Code 
§ 6041A(a),
73
 which in turn applies to “any service-recipient engaged in a trade or 
business” for payment of remuneration “in the course of such trade or business . . . to any 
person for services performed by such person,” where “the aggregate of such 
remuneration paid to such person during such calendar year is $600 or more.”
74
  
This withholding requirement triggers based only on actual payments of 
remuneration for services rendered, not just the obligation to pay such remuneration.  The 
$600 threshold is for “remuneration paid” to the person providing services.  Treasury 
regulations confirm this reading: For backup withholding purposes, “[a]mounts are 
considered paid when they are credited to the account of, or made available to, the payee.  
Amounts are not considered paid solely because they are posted (e.g., an informational 
notation on the payee's passbook) if they are not actually credited to the payee's account 
or made available to the payee.”
75
  
III.  THE METHODS OF INFORMING 
This Part identifies two ways for the unpaid worker to help enforce employer tax 
liability for wage underpayment: (1) becoming a tax informant, either gratis or for a 
reward; and (2) pursuing a qui tam tax fraud action against the employer under the (few) 
state false claims acts that would permit such claims.  In these ways, the unpaid worker 
can transmit to the tax authority the information necessary to prove tax liability for wage 
underpayment.  Such information includes not only the fact of underpayment, but also 
contract price, the type of services rendered, time actually worked, and other information 
relevant to determining the cash value of the services rendered.  Absent such information 
from the unpaid worker, tax authorities will find it difficult to enforce employer tax 
liability arising from wage underpayment, because standard wage-reporting does not 
contain such information.
76
  
                                                     
70 Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(a)-1(b) (1983) (emphasis added).  To be sure, employers may elect to 
adopt one among several methods of calculating how much tax to withhold based on the amount of wages 
estimated to be paid during a payroll period.  I.R.C. § 3402(h) (2006).  However, each of these calculation 
methods still depends on the initial input of the amount of wages paid by the employer.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Fior D'Italia, 536 U.S. 238, 243 (2002) (upholding IRS's “aggregate” method of estimating 
employer FICA tax liability for tips as reasonable). 
71 Treas. Reg. § 31.3402(a)-1(b) (as amended in 1983). 
72 I.R.C. § 3406(a) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 31.3406(a)-1(a) (1995). 
73 See I.R.C. §§ 3406(b)(1)(B), 3406(b)(3)(B) (2006). 
74 I.R.C. § 6041A(a) (2006). 
75 Treas. Reg. § 31.3406(a)-4(a)(1) (as amended in 2002). 
76 Every year, employers must file a W-2 with the Social Security Administration for each worker.  
Every quarter, employers must file a Form 941 with the IRS and report, among other things, the number of 
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A.  Tax Informant 
There are two main ways for the unpaid worker to become a tax informant.  First, 
the unpaid worker can contact tax enforcement officials directly.  For example, the IRS 
provides that any person who wishes to report possible instances of tax fraud by another 
individual, and does not want a reward, can complete and file a designated “information 
referral” form, or write a letter.
77
 
Second, the unpaid worker can apply for a tax informant reward.  Tax informant 
reward programs exist for federal taxes collected by the IRS, the Alcohol Tobacco Tax 
and Trade Bureau,
78
 and some state tax authorities (Table 1). In these programs, the 
reward is often some fraction of the tax recovered as a result of the information provided. 
To illustrate, consider the IRS tax informant reward program.
79
  The IRS has the 
authority to pay sums “necessary” for “detecting underpayment of tax” or “detecting and 
bringing to trial and punishment persons guilty of violating the internal revenue laws or 
conniving at the same.”
80
  The IRS has discretion to pay an amount that would be 
“adequate compensation in the particular case, generally not to exceed fifteen percent of 
the amounts (other than interest) collected by reason of the information.”
81
  Since the 
reward is a percentage of amounts collected, the IRS acknowledges that rewards 
generally cannot be paid “for several years after the information is submitted, because the 
underlying taxpayer’s case (including any appeals) must be resolved.”
82
 
  
                                                                                                                                                 
employees who received wages, tips, and other compensation during that quarter; the total amount of such 
compensation paid; and the total amounts withheld from such compensation for FICA and income tax.  The 
Social Security Administration and the IRS work together to investigate discrepancies between an employer's 
Form 941 and W-2 wage reports.  SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL 
SYSTEM RM 02070.001 (2001), available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0102070001. 
77 Internal Revenue Manual 25.2.1.3 (Dec. 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-002-001.html#d0e66. 
78 This program's predecessor fell within the then-Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, 27 
C.F.R. § 70.41 (2002), which had such authority at least since 1959, if not earlier, see Discovery of Liability 
and Enforcement of Title, 24 Fed. Reg. 8644 (Oct. 24, 1959) (set forth at Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(g)).  
Since its creation in 2003, however, no one has made use of the Alcohol Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau’s 
tax informant program.  E-mail from Thomas K. Hogue, Director, Congressional and Public Affairs, Alcohol 
Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, to author (April 20, 2012) (on file with author). 
79 For descriptions, see Michelle M. Kwon, Whistling Dixie About the IRS Whistleblower Program 
Thanks to the IRC Confidentiality Restrictions, 29 VA. TAX REV. 447 (2010); Edward Morse, Whistleblowers 
and Tax Enforcement: Using Inside Information to Close the "Tax Gap", 24 AKRON TAX J. 1 (2009); Kneave 
Riggall, Should Tax Informants Be Paid? The Law and Economics of a Government Monopsony, 28 VA. TAX 
REV. 237 (2008); and Terri Gutierrez, IRS Informants Reward Program: Is It Fair?, 84 TAX NOTES TODAY 
1203 (1999). 
80 I.R.C. § 7623(a) (2006).  Federal tax officials have had this authority since Act of Mar. 2, 1867, 
ch. 169, § 7, 14 Stat. 471, 473. 
81Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(c) (as amended in 2012). 
82 Internal Revenue Manual 25.2.1.1(5) (Dec. 23, 2008), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-002-001.html#d0e66. 
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Table 1: Selected Tax Informant Reward Programs 
Agency Tax Type Max % Amounts 
Collected As 
Reward 
Legal Authority 
Internal Revenue 
Service, U.S. Treasury 
Dept. 
All “generally” 15% 
(except interest)  
I.R.C. § 7623 (2006);  
Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1 (as 
amended in 2012) 
Alcohol Tobacco Tax 
& Trade Bureau, U.S. 
Treasury Dept. 
alcohol, 
tobacco, 
firearms 
10% 27 C.F.R. § 70.41 (2011) 
California Board of 
Equalization 
sales, use 10% CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 
7060(a) (2012) 
California Franchise 
Tax Board 
personal 
income, 
corporation 
10% CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 19525 
(2012) 
Oregon Dept. of 
Revenue 
Income 10% of “net 
amount of” tax, 
penalties, interest 
OR. REV. STAT. § 314.855 (2011) 
Florida Dept. of 
Revenue 
All 10% of tax, 
penalties, interest 
FLA. STAT. § 213.30 (2011) 
Florida Dept. of 
Business and 
Professional 
Regulation, Division of 
Alcoholic Beverages & 
Tobacco 
Cigarette 50% of fine levied 
and paid 
FLA. STAT. § 210.18(11) (2011) 
Florida Dept. of 
Revenue 
vending 
machine 
items 
10% FLA. STAT. § 212.0515(3)(b) 
(2011) 
Kansas Dept. of 
Revenue 
motor-
vehicle 
fuels, 
special 
fuels 
10% KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3421 
(2011)  
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Figure 1: IRS Informant Program, FY1977-2010 
 
Figure 1 reports for fiscal years 1977-2010 the number of informant claims 
received and “allowed” by the IRS pursuant to I.R.C. § 7623(a), as well as the annual 
aggregate tax recovery (including penalties, fines, and interest) and informant rewards 
paid pursuant to that provision.
83
 
In 2006, Congress enacted a more generous informant rewards program, codified 
at I.R.C. § 7623(b).  It entitles the informant to at least fifteen percent of any recovery if 
the IRS brings an administrative or judicial action based on the informant's information.  
However, for that provision to apply, the tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and 
additional amounts in dispute must exceed $2 million.  Any one unpaid-worker informant 
is unlikely to meet this threshold.  
B.  Qui Tam Action under State False Claims Act 
Another option, available only in a few states, is a qui tam lawsuit under a false 
claims act.  By January 2010, Congress, eighteen states, and the District of Columbia had 
enacted false claims acts (“FCAs”) with qui tam provisions that apply to more than 
certain types of health fraud.
84
  However, Congress, eleven of these states, and the 
District of Columbia have expressly excluded claims under their FCAs based on any 
obligation under tax law.
85
  Moreover, the Florida legislature declared in 2002 that the 
state code section authorizing tax informant rewards is the “sole means” for seeking or 
obtaining money predicated upon another person's failure to comply with Florida tax 
law.
86
  Thus, a court is not likely to read Florida's FCA to authorize tax fraud claims. 
                                                     
83 IRS provided the underlying data to the author for the fiscal years through 2007.  For fiscal years 
2008-10, see IRS, FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE USE OF SECTION 7623 at tbl. 2 (2011), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/whistleblower/annual_report_to_congress_fy_2010.pdf. 
84 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 6-3 (2010). 
85 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(d) (West Supp. 2011); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12651(f) (West 2012); D.C. 
CODE § 2-381.02(d)(3) (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-21(f) (2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12, § 5B(12) 
(2011); MINN. STAT. § 15C.03 (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. 17-8-403(4) (2011); N.C. REV. STAT. § 1-607(c) 
(2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:32C-2 (2011); N.M. STAT § 44-9-3(E) (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 5053.1(E) 
(2011); TENN. CODE ANN. 4-18-103(f) (2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-216.3(D) (2011).  For policy arguments 
favoring qui tam tax fraud actions, see Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 61 TAX 
LAW. 357 (2008). 
86 Act of May 1, 2002, ch. 2002-218, § 37, 2002 Fla. Laws 1510, 1558 (codified at FLA. STAT. 
§ 213.30(3) (2011)).  The provision was introduced as an amendment to Florida Senate Bill 426. See H. 
Amendment 042761, at 83 (filed March 14, 2002); S. 426E2, § 37, at 90-91, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 
2002) (introduced March 23, 2002).  Almost a year earlier, a Florida court had dismissed on procedural 
grounds a FCA qui tam tax fraud suit filed against West Palm Beach condominium owners.  See Joe Kollin, 
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The remaining six states have FCAs with provisions that can be read to cover tax 
claims,
87
 but most of these impose substantial restrictions.  Illinois and Indiana exclude 
claims under their FCAs based on their state income tax obligations.
88
  Rhode Island's 
FCA excludes claims based on its personal income tax,
89
 but it does not restrict claims 
based on its business income tax obligations.
90
  New York's FCA sets high defendant 
income and damage threshold for tax fraud claims.
91
  Although Nevada's FCA does not 
exclude tax obligations, Nevada has no state income tax.  In contrast, Delaware, which 
taxes personal and corporate income,
92
 has an FCA that does not restrict tax fraud claims 
in any way. 
IV.  THE DECISION TO INFORM 
Even if courts and tax authorities agree that employers incur tax liability for 
wage underpayment as discussed above, only empirical research can show how much 
such liability would in fact deter employer wage underpayment or otherwise affect 
worker or employer behavior.  To advance such research, this Part, drawing on the 
theoretical literature on the law enforcement uses of bounties and rewards,
93
 identifies 
major benefits and costs that might influence a worker to decide to inform the tax agency 
about the employer’s wage underpayment (by the methods described above), assuming 
that the worker will do so if and only if the expected benefits exceeds its expected costs.  
An alternative exposition appears in the Appendix.  
A.  Benefits 
Two important influences in favor of becoming a tax informant are the expected 
informant reward and any emotional satisfaction from facilitating tax recovery (e.g., 
revenge savored, conscience eased).  
As noted in Table 1, most tax informant rewards are some fraction of the total tax 
recovery facilitated by the informant's assistance, often the tax owed plus penalties.  In 
theory, the fact or amount of reward varies by enforcement mechanism.  For simply 
sending a letter to the tax authority, of course, the expected money reward is zero.  This 
implies that for those workers who actually pursue those avenues, the emotional 
satisfaction of facilitating recovery exceeds the expected costs of informing. 
Moreover, in qui tam FCA actions, if we treat the probability of successful 
recovery as the probability that the qui tam plaintiffs will successfully recover the taxes 
and penalties owed in a court judgment, tax officials control the size of the expected 
informant bounty only by their decision to take control of the FCA lawsuit.  For example, 
                                                                                                                                                 
Judge Tosses Suit on Unpaid Taxes, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, April 4, 2001, at 1B; Joe Kollin, For-profit 
Company Rebuffed in Lawsuit, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 22, 2001, at 1B. 
87 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 1201(a)(7) (2011); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/3(a)(G) (2011); IND. CODE 
§ 5-11-5.5-2(b)(6) (2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 357.040(1)(g) (2010); N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(1) 
(McKinney 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1.1-3(a)(7) (2011). 
88 740 ILL. COMP. STAT.  175/3(c) (2011); IND. CODE § 5-11-5.5-2(a) (2011). 
89 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1.1-3(d) (2011). 
90 R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 41-11-11(a)(1), 41-11-2(c) (2011) (relying on federal income tax definition 
as computational starting point). 
91 N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 189(4)(a) (2011) (defendant's net income or sales must be more than or 
equal to $1 million for relevant taxable year, and pleaded damages must exceed $350,000). 
92 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1105 (2011) (federal adjusted gross income as computational 
starting point for “entire taxable income” of a state resident); id. § 1903 (corporation’s federal taxable income 
as computational starting point for state corporation income tax). 
93 See, in particular, Yaniv, supra note 10. 
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under the FCAs in Delaware and Rhode Island, if the state attorney general elects to 
proceed with a tax fraud action brought by the qui tam relator, that relator must be 
awarded no less than fifteen and no more than twenty-five percent of the proceeds of that 
action.  If the state attorney general elects not to proceed, then the qui tam relator must be 
awarded no less than twenty-five percent and no more than thirty percent of the proceeds 
of the action.
94
  
However, both the expected reward and any emotional satisfaction for facilitating 
recovery must be discounted by the probability that the tax authority will decide to audit 
the employer and successfully recover the taxes owed, plus penalties.  This in turn 
consists of two separate variables: the odds of selecting the informant's employer for a 
tax audit, and, if audited, the odds of successfully recovering taxes owed from that 
employer.  I discuss audit selection in Part IV(E) below. 
B.  Costs 
There are three major kinds of costs to a worker who decides to inform the tax 
authorities about an employer’s wage underpayment.  First, the worker incurs a cost to 
search for and acquire the relevant information.  This cost may presumably be low, 
because, as discussed above, the failure of the employer to pay the worker the wages 
promised is itself sufficient to make a credible case of employer tax liability.  Second, the 
unpaid worker may suffer a psychic cost of informing, such as fear of reprisal, shame, or 
other forms of emotional discomfort.
95
  
Search and psychic costs may vary, particularly when a labor union, law firm, or 
other NGO is involved.  In some situations, such NGOs may actively support workers to 
become tax informants.  In other situations, an NGO may be the tax informant by 
aggregating unpaid workers’ information (e.g., by collecting worker affidavits) and 
applying to the tax authority for tax informant rewards on that basis.  In either case, the 
unpaid worker must decide how much to cooperate with the NGO, but the NGO may 
reduce the worker's expected search and psychic costs by providing money, legal 
services, or emotional support arising from NGO esprit de corps.  
The third cost item is the expected loss of future wages from the employer on 
whom the worker informs, discounted to present value.  The size of this loss depends on 
if and when the employer fires the worker after identifying him or her as an informant.  It 
also depends on how long the worker expects to continue to work for that employer after 
deciding to become an informant.  And this in turn is partially determined by how 
competitive the relevant labor market is.  In a competitive labor market, we should expect 
unpaid workers to immediately seek work elsewhere.  As worker mobility costs increase, 
or as labor market competition becomes more imperfect, we should expect the unpaid 
worker to work longer for the underpaying employer, despite the apparent risk of future 
wage underpayment.  The worker may prefer to accept some risk of future wage 
underpayment from that employer over a spell of unemployment. 
Here, the amount of foregone future wages should vary by how the unpaid 
worker proceeds, in part because that affects the odds that the employer will identify the 
unpaid worker as the informant.  For example, in qui tam FCA actions, if the unpaid 
worker is one of the named qui tam plaintiffs, then the employer can identify the worker-
                                                     
94 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1205(a),(b) (2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1.1-4(d)(1),(2) (2011). 
95 Qui tam FCA tax actions also entail court costs, litigation expenses, and attorney fees that may or 
may not be covered by a contingency-fee arrangement.  To simplify, I have assumed that the cost of filing for 
tax informant status is zero. 
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informant just by reading the complaint.  For the tax informant who sends an informal 
letter or applies for a reward, the probability of employer identification will vary with 
how reliably the agency's procedures prevent disclosure of informant identity and how 
likely the procedure for imposing tax liability will cause disclosure of the informant's 
identity.
96
  To be sure, if the informant's emotional satisfaction in facilitating recovery 
comes from the employer knowing who helped tax officials detect the employer's tax 
violations, then that satisfaction will be higher if employer identification of the worker-
informant is highly likely or certain.  
Thus far, we have assumed that, once identified, the worker-informant will 
always be fired.  However, even if the employer positively identifies the worker-
informant, NGO support may reduce the risk of any subsequent firing.  The employer 
may fear NGO economic pressure in response or a NGO-financed lawsuit under, for 
example, state whistleblower statutes or state tort law for wrongful discharge in violation 
of public policy.  Such laws, however, vary by state and recovery under them is far from 
certain.
97
  To be sure, given such NGO support, unpaid workers may well pursue 
traditional legal remedies, such as an FLSA lawsuit, in any case. 
C.  The Undocumented Worker 
We now consider the expected cost of deportation for a tax informant with 
undocumented immigration status.  If the unpaid worker has undocumented immigration 
status, we should expect that worker, in deciding whether to become a tax informant, to 
be influenced by specific fears of deportation itself, and the costs of deportation 
discounted by the probability of deportation.  For example, Gleeson (2010) found, from 
interviews with forty-one workers at “mainstream restaurant establishments” in San Jose, 
California, and Houston, Texas, that the thirty undocumented workers she interviewed 
tended not to complain about wage and hour violations or workplace safety concerns, 
because they feared deportation or other employer reprisals.
98
  Similarly, in her survey of 
Latino migrant laborers in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina (n = 194), Fussell (2011) 
found that over ninety percent were undocumented, and over forty percent reported 
experiencing wage nonpayment or underpayment—on average, two times during their 
time in New Orleans.  In separate focus groups with twenty-five post-Katrina Latino 
migrants conducted in December 2009, participants explained that employers did threaten 
to call immigration authorities if the migrants complained, and that, because of the fear of 
deportation, the migrants accepted losses due to wage theft rather than complain.
99
 
                                                     
96 For the IRS program, a tax informant’s identity is not to be disclosed to any “unauthorized 
person.” Treas. Reg. § 301.7623-1(e) (as amended in 2012). 
97 For examples of court opinions rejecting state tort claims where the plaintiff alleged termination 
in retaliation for the plaintiff's reporting of employer violations of tax law, see Milton v. IIT Research Inst., 
138 F.3d 519 (4th Cir. 1998); and Chism v. Mid-South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988). 
98 Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for 
Worker Claims Making, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 561, 578, 581-86 (2010); see also Leisy J. Abrego, Legal 
Consciousness of Undocumented Latinos: Fear And Stigma as Barriers to Claims-Making for First- And 1.5-
Generation Immigrants, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337, 365 (2011) (“Workers in this study [based on interviews 
with largely undocumented Salvadoran immigrants in Los Angeles] mentioned injuries, wage theft, and 
humiliation as part of their daily work environment, but, fearful of interacting with officials who may inquire 
about their legal status and possibly report them to [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] agents, few 
reported the abuse they suffered.”).  
99 Elizabeth Fussell, The Deportation Threat Dynamic and Victimization of Latino Migrants: Wage 
Theft and Robbery, 52 SOCIOLOGICAL Q. 593, 602-04, 607-08 (2011). 
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Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that any change in the probability of 
employer identification of the tax informant will lead to a change in the same direction in 
the probability of informant deportation, for at least two reasons.  
First, federal prosecutors and tax authorities lack the authority to bind federal 
immigration authorities to cooperation or immunity agreements for undocumented 
informants, absent their express written authorization from federal immigration 
authorities.
100
  There appears to be no existing interagency agreement between federal tax 
and immigration agencies concerning undocumented tax informants.  Meanwhile, state 
officials have no authority to promise immunity from deportation or prosecution under 
federal law.  
This may be a serious problem if the worker's decision to inform leads to a 
proceeding that authorizes discovery.  Through discovery, an employer may come to 
learn of the informant's undocumented status.  When undocumented workers are asked to 
provide testimonial evidence that pertains to immigration status, Cunningham-Parmeter 
(2008) argues that they could successfully invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, because of the quasi-criminal nature of removal proceedings.
101
  
Moreover, courts can issue protective orders to preclude discovery that may reveal 
immigration status.
102
  However, seeking such an order may confirm third party 
suspicion of undocumented status.  To date, no study has found how often motions for 
such protective orders succeed or how much such orders or the Fifth Amendment 
privilege reduce the risk of immigration status disclosure.  
Second, it is uncertain how many, if any, undocumented workers will be eligible 
for U-1 non-immigrant status (a U-visa) for cooperating with law enforcement 
investigating tax violations.  U-visa eligibility requires that (1) the applicant suffered 
“substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of having been a victim of criminal 
activity” that falls within particular statutory categories; (2) the applicant has information 
“concerning” that criminal activity; (3) the applicant has been, is being, or is likely to be 
helpful to federal, state, or local law enforcement in investigating or prosecuting that 
criminal activity; and (4) the criminal activity in question violated the laws of the United 
States or occurred in the United States.
103
  
The statute, however, does not include tax fraud or theft-of-service among its 
categories of criminal activity.  To be sure, it does include “perjury,” a felony that a 
taxpayer commits by willfully misreporting income on a return.
104
  However, by 
regulation, a person who petitions for a U-1 visa as a “perjury” victim must show that he 
or she “has been directly and proximately harmed by the perpetrator” of the perjury, and 
that there are “reasonable grounds” to conclude that the perpetrator  
                                                     
100 28 C.F.R. § 0.197 (2011).  For discussion, see, for example, Colleen Melody, Trading 
Information for Safety: Immigrant Informants, Federal Law-Enforcement Agents, and the Viability of Non-
Deportation Agreements, 83 WASH. L. REV. 599 (2008). 
101 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Fear of Discovery: Immigrant Workers and the Fifth Amendment, 
41 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 27 (2008). 
102 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2004).  For examples of 
parallel authority in other courts, see TAX CT. R. 103(a) (2010); DEL. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 26(c) (2012); R.I. R. 
CIV. P. 26(c) (2012). 
103 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i) (2006). 
104 See I.R.C. § 7206(1) (2006); MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 7A.04(1) 
(2009). 
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committed the . . . perjury offense, at least in principal part, as a means: 
(1) To avoid or frustrate efforts to investigate, arrest, prosecute, or 
otherwise bring to justice the perpetrator for other criminal activity; or 
(2) To further the perpetrator's abuse or exploitation of or undue control 
over the petitioner through manipulation of the legal system.
105
  
To satisfy these additional requirements, a lawyer might argue that an employer 
committed tax perjury to help shield from official scrutiny the employer's capacity to 
wield the threat of deportation to exploit undocumented workers.  On this reading, the 
threat of deportation is the requisite “manipulation of the legal system” used to further the 
employer's “exploitation or undue control over” the worker, and the fear of deportation is 
the “substantial . . . emotional abuse” suffered by the U-visa petitioner. 
There is, however, little publicly available information from which to reliably 
estimate the odds that an agency or court would agree with this reading.  Although a 2009 
unpublished letter ruling can be read as concluding that fear of deportation cannot 
establish the requisite “substantial physical or mental abuse,”
106
 that ruling has not been 
designated “for publication as precedent in future proceedings.”
107
  Moreover, because 
not even the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, which decides U-visa petitions, 
can currently track U-visa petitions by type of qualifying criminal activity alleged,
108
 we 
cannot easily ascertain the outcomes of past U-visa petitions, if any, that made such an 
argument.  Of the over thirty letter rulings that the USCIS's Administrative Appeals 
Office issued to date since January 1, 2009 concerning the denial of a U-visa petition, 
none have concerned U-1 visas based on “perjury.”
109
  
D.  Tax Informant Immunity? 
We now consider a wage underpayment scenario in which the worker has also 
incurred tax liability of which the employer is aware, such as not reporting the wages he 
did receive as income.  If wage underpayment occurs where the employer primarily 
conducts transactions in cash to avoid documentary evidence of taxable income or assets, 
unpaid workers may indirectly benefit insofar as such employers are less likely to report 
the wages they do pay, thereby making it easier for the worker not to report those wages 
as individual income.  In this scenario, either worker or employer could decide to seek 
tax informant rewards by informing on the other to the tax authority. 
This scenario resembles models in Cooter and Garoupa (2000) and Yadlin (2006) 
in which co-conspirators can defect or continue to cooperate under a regime where the 
defector's payoff is (1) a portion of the penalty that would be imposed on his co-
conspirator and (2) immunity to the extent of one’s own gain from the conspiracy.  Under 
certain assumptions, each co-conspirator faces a prisoner's dilemma such that, where the 
                                                     
105 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(14)(ii) (2011). 
106 Matter of [Redacted], No. EAC 08 110 50406, 2009 WL 1742300 (Office of Admin. Appeals, 
Immigration and Naturalization Service Mar. 5, 2009); Farhang Heydari, Note, Making Strange Bedfellows: 
Enlisting the Cooperation of Undocumented Employees in the Enforcement of Employer Sanctions, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1554-57 (2010) (relying on this ruling). 
107 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(c) (2011). 
108 E-mail from Chris Rhatigan, Public Affairs Officer, USCIS, to author (Dec. 2, 2010) (on file 
with author). 
109 Search of Westlaw database FIM-AAU [“section 101(a)(15)(u)”] on Jan. 4, 2012. 
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payoffs for defecting are high enough and each can anticipate the other's payoffs, each is 
less likely to commit to cooperation in the first place.
110
 
To illustrate, consider a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game between a worker and 
an employer who each face tax liability ($50 and $100, respectively) and who can each 
inform on the other.  Assume that tax liability is the same as the tax gain from 
cooperating and does not include penalties or interest.  Assume also that any informant 
(worker or employer) gains immunity for tax liability he would have otherwise had, as 
well as a reward in the amount of a portion (15%) of the other's tax liability, adjusted by 
the probability that the informant's information results in a successful tax recovery (75%).  
If both worker and employer inform, then each has an equal chance of becoming the first 
to inform.  Table 2 reports payoffs under these assumptions. 
 
Table 2: One-Shot Worker-Employer Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
 Employer Cooperates Employer Informs 
Worker Cooperates $50, $100 $12.50, $105.63 
Worker Informs $61.25, $25 $30.63, $52.82 
 
If both worker and employer cooperate, the employer gains by avoiding tax 
liability for wage underpayment ($100) and the worker gains by avoiding tax liability for 
not reporting wages received ($50).  If only the worker informs, he gains $61.25: $50 
from the tax immunity as well a reward of $11.25 (=.75[.15($100)]), while the employer 
loses the tax gain from wage underpayment, discounted by the probability of successful 
audit (=.75($100)).  If only the employer informs, he gains $105.63: $100 from tax 
immunity as well as a reward of $5.63 (=.75[.15($50)]), while the worker only gets 
$12.50, that is, $50 as discounted by the probability of successful audit (=.75($50)).  If 
both worker and employer inform, then we divide by half the payoffs in scenarios where 
the worker or the employer is the only informant ($61.25/2 and $105.63/2, respectively).  
Under these conditions, both worker and employer will race to inform on the 
other.  In turn, since they both will anticipate this result, both worker and employer are 
therefore less likely to underpay wages and fail to report paid wages as income, 
respectively.  This result holds in part because we have assumed automatic tax immunity 
for informing.  Indeed, in calculating payoffs, the tax immunity is more valuable than the 
expected informant reward.  To date, however, tax officials appear unlikely to make a tax 
immunity guarantee part of an informant reward.  To the contrary, current IRS policy 
provides that, for purposes of award computation under I.R.C. § 7623, it is a “negative” 
factor that the informant “actively and knowingly participates in carrying out the tax 
noncompliance” or “directly or indirectly profits from the noncompliance.”
111
 
                                                     
110 See Yadlin, supra note 10, at 31; Cooter & Garoupa, supra note 10, at 5. 
111 Internal Revenue Manual 25.2.2.9.2(11)(B) (June 18, 2010) available at 
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-002-002.html#d0e844. 
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Moreover, tax officials may be unwilling to forgo the discretion to grant or deny 
immunity or offer other reasons to cooperate, such as a sentencing recommendation, 
especially if the informant has more tax liability than the one on whom he informs.  
Absent an immunity guarantee, however, the unpaid worker may be less likely to decide 
to inform given uncertainty about how tax officials will react to the worker's own tax 
liability. 
E.  Audit Selection 
This section discusses the difficulty of estimating the probability that the tax 
agency will select the employer to audit based on the unpaid worker's information and 
successfully recover the taxes owed plus penalties.  We have thus far assumed that 
potential informants can accurately estimate this probability.
112
  This probability matters, 
because absent a tax authority audit of the employer, the tax authority cannot prove any 
employer tax liability as a result of its wage underpayment and, in turn, the worker is 
ineligible for any tax-informant reward.   
An audit does not necessarily follow from a valid tax informant application.  To 
reinforce the intuition, consider again Figure 1.  It shows that, over a thirty-year period, 
the number of informant claims rewarded by the IRS has not varied to the same degree as 
the annual number of informant claims filed.  This either implies that the fluctuations in 
informant claims consist primarily of annual changes in the number of meritless claims 
filed, or what is more likely, that the IRS audit budget sets a limit on the number of 
meritorious claims that the agency can pursue to recovery.  This section considers two 
possible influences on audit selection among valid informant claims: expected net 
recovery and politics.  
First, the audit selection literature assumes that audit selection is influenced in 
part by expected net recovery.  In some models,
113
 a tax authority selects taxpayers to 
audit to maximize net tax revenue, but, absent an audit, the tax authority does not know 
whether any taxpayer's actual gross income is equal to or greater than their reported gross 
income.  Under these conditions, the probability of selecting a particular taxpayer to audit 
is a function of the tax authority's estimate of the probability that there is income tax 
liability and the expected size of the net recovery from the audit (including penalties and 
interest, but subtracting the fixed cost of the audit).  
A tax informant's information amounts to evidence that the taxpayer's gross 
income exceeds its reported gross income, and thus an audit is more likely if that 
information implies net tax owed.  However, net tax recovery still may not be positive, 
because we must now also subtract the informant's reward from any audit recovery.  
Moreover, if the average net recovery is low for wage underpayment informant claims, 
the tax authority may elect to audit underpaying employers rarely.  Wage-underpayment 
informants are effectively competing with other kinds of tax informants for a share of the 
tax authority's audit investment portfolio, and are, on this view, less attractive then 
potential audits with a higher expected return on investment.  
To be sure, if the tax authority assumes that an employer who has underpaid the 
informant has more likely than not done so for all its workers, then the tax authority can 
estimate far higher gross tax recovery by multiplying it by the average number of workers 
                                                     
112 Absent this assumption, we have to account for conditions under which potential informants are 
likely to overestimate or underestimate this probability, and thereby over- or underestimate their expected 
informant reward. 
113 See, e.g., James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 824-34 (1998). 
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doing the same job for that employer in the taxable year.  Another possibility is that, if 
wage underpayment occurs most often among small cash businesses, which are likely to 
underreport business cash income as well as evade employment tax and sales tax,
114
 then 
audits of underpaying employers may yield a far higher rate of return if tax auditors 
investigate more than the employer's wage-underpayment. 
Second, in the research literature, there is some evidence of political influences 
on tax audit selection in general.  Scholz and Wood (1998) found that, for the period 
1974-1992, the odds of corporate versus individual IRS audits increased with greater 
Democratic party control over Congress, change in Presidents, and the composition of the 
taxpaying district and revenue, but not changes in state-level partisanship.
115
  Howard 
(2001) found that federal district court filings against the IRS were negatively correlated 
with a (lagged) ratio of the audits conducted during the period 1980-1988 of individuals 
with incomes over $70,000 with audits of individuals with annual incomes under 
$70,000.  From this, he concluded that litigation led the IRS to shift audits away from the 
wealthy to the less affluent.
116
  Other studies have found effects on IRS audit behavior 
from the median ideology of the relevant federal court of appeals
117
 and the tax district's 
electoral importance to the President.
118
  If these findings hold with respect to tax audits 
of employers for wage underpayment, then it may well be that audits of underpaying 
employers, as identified by unpaid-worker informants, are more likely with more 
Democratic party control over Congress and for less affluent employers. 
It will be difficult to measure how much expected net recovery and politics, 
among other possible influences, actually affect audit selection based on wage-
underpayment informants.  Tax informant claims files are likely the best data for this 
purpose, but confidentiality provisions typically restrict access to those files.  Even with 
access, claims files may lack sufficient documentation.  In an internal audit study of a 
non-random “judgmental sample” of IRS informant reward claim files processed in fiscal 
year 2005, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration could not determine 
the justification for the percentage rewarded in thirty-two percent of the paid claims 
(seven out of twenty-two) and the rationale for rejection in seventy-six percent of rejected 
claims (fifty-two out of sixty-nine).
119
  The audit was based on a convenience sample, 
because at the time, the IRS had no nationwide informant claims database.
120
  Perhaps 
more recent informant claim files may better document the reasons for accepting or 
rejecting a claim if internal documentation protocols require an explicit accounting along 
                                                     
114 See, e.g., Susan Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
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117 Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, Regional Court Influence Over Bureaucratic 
Policymaking: Courts, Ideological Preferences, and the Internal Revenue Service, 55 POL. RES. Q. 907, 918 
(2002). 
118 Marilyn Young et al., The Political Economy of the IRS, 13 ECON. & POL. 201, 215 (2001). 
119 INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREAS., 2006-30-092, THE 
INFORMANTS' REWARDS PROGRAM NEEDS MORE CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT 2 (2006). 
120 Id. at 11 n.2. 
140 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.3:113 
 
the enumerated positive and negative factors that now govern award computation for 
informant claims filed after July 2010.
121
 
V.  COMPLEMENT TO OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT APPROACHES 
This Part identifies two distinct advantages of the tax-liability approach to wage 
theft: (1) the tax authority’s special collection powers; and (2) the non-deductibility of tax 
penalties as business expenses.  These advantages warrant treating the tax-liability 
approach as a serious complement to other law enforcement approaches to combating 
wage theft. 
First, tax authorities have a considerable advantage over the typical judgment-
creditor in collecting taxes owed.  For example, if upon requisite notice a taxpayer 
neglects or refuses to pay taxes owed, the IRS can seize and sell that taxpayer’s property 
or rights thereto.
122
  Moreover, if the taxpayer transfers its property to others to avoid 
collection, but still controls or benefits from that property, the IRS can sue the transferee 
directly in federal tax court, rather than pursue more cumbersome actions under state 
fraudulent conveyance statutes.
123
  To be sure, where the taxpayer has, at the outset, no 
assets to satisfy the judgment, these powers may not be useful.  However, tax authorities 
do have an advantage over the typical judgment-creditor in combating efforts of the 
penalized employer to delay or defeat collection. 
Second, the tax treatment of tax penalties is more favorable to preserving any 
deterrent effect of legal action, all else being equal, because tax penalties are not 
deductible as business expenses.  Internal Revenue Code § 162(a) currently permits 
business-expense deductions for damages (compensatory and punitive), attorney’s fees, 
and other costs that businesses pay to defend, settle, or satisfy judgments in lawsuits 
under various employment laws, including the FLSA.
124
  In this way, § 162(a) effectively 
provides business with a limited form of commercial liability insurance where policy 
limits increase with the applicable tax rate, and thus in theory dampens any deterrent 
effect that such lawsuits might have otherwise had on future employer behavior.  
In contrast, tax penalties, as well as other civil and criminal penalties paid to a 
government, are not deductible as business expenses.  Section 162(f) of the Code does 
not allow such deductions under § 162(a) “for any fine or similar penalty paid to a 
government for the violation of any law.”
125
  Fines aside, the word “similar” has been 
read to limit this section to cover civil penalties imposed to enforce the law and punish 
                                                     
121 Internal Revenue Manual 25.2.2.9.2(3), (10)-(11) (June 18, 2010). available at 
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123 See I.R.C. § 6901(a)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (transferee liability for income tax liability).  For an 
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124 See Rev. Rul. 69-581, 1969-2 C.B. 25 (Fair Labor Standards Act liquidated damages payments 
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125 I.R.C. § 162(f) (2006); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.162–21(a) (as amended in 1975). 
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violators thereof, as opposed to civil penalties to encourage prompt compliance (e.g., 
penalties for late filing) or to compensate another for expenses caused by the violation.
126
   
Moreover, the accompanying Treasury Regulation to § 162(f) provides that the 
phrase “fine or similar penalty” includes, among other things, an amount “[p]aid as a civil 
penalty imposed by Federal, State, or local law, including additions to tax and additional 
amounts and assessable penalties imposed by . . . the Internal Revenue Code,”
127
 as well 
as an amount “[p]aid in settlement of the taxpayer's actual or potential liability for a fine 
or penalty (civil or criminal).”
128
  The phrase “fine or similar penalty” does not include 
“legal fees and related expenses paid or incurred in the defense of a prosecution or civil 
action arising from a violation of the law imposing the fine or civil penalty, nor court 
costs assessed against the taxpayer, or stenographic and printing charges.”
129
  
The phrase “fine or similar penalty” also does not include “[c]ompensatory 
damages . . . paid to a government.”
130
  The latter gives rise to litigation over what 
portion, if any, of civil settlement payments to the government are properly characterized 
as a nondeductible “penalty” or as a potentially deductible “compensatory” payment.  For 
example, according to the IRS, if a defendant in a FCA suit pays qui tam relator fees 
pursuant to a settlement of claims against it under the federal FCA, this payment does not 
count as a “penalty” under § 162(f).  Rather, the relator-fees payment should be treated as 
an item of “compensatory damages . . . paid” to the government to compensate the 
government for its existing legal obligation to pay those fees to the FCA relator.  The 
offered reason is that, had the government paid the relator fees, it could have recovered 
those fees from the defendant under the FCA provision authorizing government recovery 
of its incurred enforcement costs.
131
   
In contrast, where a taxpayer settles a claim for tax liability arising from wage 
underpayment, a tax informant’s reward is a percentage of tax recovery (see Table 1).  
That tax recovery falls within the regulation that defines the phrase “fine or similar 
penalty” to include “additions to tax and additional amounts and assessable penalties 
imposed by . . . the Internal Revenue Code.”
132
  Once a portion of that recovery is 
rewarded to the tax informant, there is arguably no basis to stop treating the amount of 
that reward as something other than a portion of a “penalty” under § 162(f). 
This Part has identified two advantages of the tax-liability approach to combating 
wage theft: the tax authority’s special collection powers and the non-deductibility of tax 
penalties as business expenses.  The value of these advantages, however, must be 
discounted by the probability that the unpaid worker becomes a tax informant; that the 
tax authority audits that worker’s employer on that basis; and that such audit generates 
enough proof to establish tax liability.  For this reason, the tax-liability approach to wage 
theft only complements, not substitutes for, existing strategies for combating wage theft, 
such as private lawsuits and agency enforcement proceedings.   
                                                     
126 See, e.g., S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 497, 650-52 (1980).  For the interpretative 
genealogy of I.R.C. § 162(f), see F. Philip Manns, Jr., Internal Revenue Code Section 162(f): When Does the 
Payment of Damages to a Government Punish The Payor?, 13 VA. TAX REV. 271, 276-288 (1993). 
127 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1975). 
128 Treas. Reg. § 1.162–21(b)(1)(iii) (as amended in 1975). 
129 Treas. Reg. § 1.162–21(b)(2)  (as amended in 1975). 
130 Id. 
131 I.R.S. Chief Counsel Advice 2007-0015, at 5-9 (July 12, 2007) available at 
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/am2007015.pdf. 
132 Treas. Reg. § 1.162–21(b)(1)(ii). 
142 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.3:113 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has shown how, under existing federal and state tax law, underpaying 
employers face tax liability for failing to report unpaid wages as income or, in some 
circumstances, for claiming paid or unpaid wages as deductible business expenses.  The 
paper then discussed the conditions under which unpaid workers might decide to help tax 
authorities enforce such liability by becoming tax informants or pursuing a qui tam tax 
fraud action.  Finally, the paper identified two distinct advantages of pursuing tax liability 
as an important complement to other law enforcement approaches to wage theft.   
The paper is limited in several respects.  For example, it does not consider how 
such tax liability, if recognized, might affect the practices of unions, labor departments, 
lawyers and others who elect to pursue legal remedies on behalf of unpaid workers under, 
among other laws, state contract law, the Fair Labor Standards Act, or the Equal Pay Act.  
On the one hand, such tax liability may only negligibly affect case selection, given 
uncertainty as to whether the tax authority will select the case for audit and recovery, and 
given that underreporting gross income does not necessarily imply additional tax liability 
(and associated penalties).  On the other hand, these actors may use employer fear of tax-
authority audits on the basis of such tax liability to increase lawsuit settlement prices.  I 
leave these and other implications of tax liability for wage underpayment for future 
research. 
  
2012] TAX LIABILITY FOR WAGE THEFT 143 
APPENDIX 
This appendix is an alternative to Part IV(A)-(C)’s discussion of the major gains 
and costs that might influence the worker deciding whether to inform the tax agency 
about the employer’s wage underpayment.   
Assume that the worker decides to inform the tax agency about the employer’s 
tax evasion (by the methods described in Part III) if and only if the expected gain of such 
reporting (EG) exceeds its cost (C). Modifying Yaniv (2001), I model the decision to 
inform: 
    [ ( )   ]      ∑(    )    
 
   
  [ ( )    ]    
where   is the probability that the tax agency will audit the employer and successfully 
recover all the taxes owed plus penalties; Z is the amount of taxes and penalties owed; R 
is the informant's emotional satisfaction for facilitating the recovery; b is the fraction of 
the recovery to be rewarded to the informant; s is the informant’s cost of searching and 
acquiring the information; and k is the psychic cost of informing.  NGO support may 
reduce values of k and increase values of R.  For reporting to the tax authority without 
expectation of any reward, b = 0, which implies that for workers who pursue this avenue, 
   . 
The term ∑ (    )    
 
    is the present value of expected future wages lost 
from the employer because of the decision to inform on that employer, where w = the 
wages to be received from the employer at the end of a time period t; the discount factor 
    (   ) ⁄ , where r = a fixed discount rate; λ = the probability that the employer 
will fire the worker for becoming an informant; and n = the total number of time periods 
that worker expects to work for that employer after the worker’s decision to inform, such 
that n ≤ the minimum value of t for which     .  If the worker expects to leave the 
employer immediately after informing (e.g., to work elsewhere), then n = 0.  As we move 
from a perfectly competitive to a monopsonistic labor market, n should increase.  NGO 
support may decrease λ if, because of such support, the employer is less likely to fire the 
worker even after identifying that worker as an informant. 
The term  [ ( )    ]  is the expected cost of deportation for undocumented 
immigration status, where U = 1 if the worker has undocumented immigrant status, 0 if 
not;   = the probability of deportation; D = the costs of deportation to the deported 
worker; and k
*
= the specific fears of deportation. 
